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IMPROVING PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE
DIVORCED FAMILY: A CALL FOR
LEGAL REFORM
John S. Murray*
Our society reveres family autonomy in childrearing. Each
family has the responsibility and authority, within broad limits,
to determine the care, education, discipline, and general activities of its offspring.' We view state interference with the intact
family as not only ineffective and inappropriate in most cases,
but also contrary to principles of family rights and personal
liberty.2
The family in divorce, however, faces a different tradition. We
accept mandatory state inquiry and intervention in the most
personal of family activities both during the divorce process and
beyond.3 States require courts to evaluate existing parent-child
relationships and reorder them to adjust to the new living patterns of the spouses.4 Moreover, courts assert a continuing readi*

Professor of Law, Texas Tech School of Law. A.B., 1961, Cornell University; M.A.,

1962, Columbia University; J.D., 1968, University of Iowa.
1. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399401 (1923). Some courts have restated this parental interest in a reciprocal manner: the
child has the right to enforce the parental duty to "nurture, support, educate and protect
his minor children." Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975).
2. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Ard v. Ard, 414
So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. 1971);
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8-13
(1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]; Comment, The Extension of
Substantive Due Process Rights to Noncustodial Parents, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1038, 103943 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (adultery committed
after separation); Thomason v. Thomason, 332 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Civ. App. 1959) (stating
that extreme sexual demands constitute cruelty). For examples of the inquiry needed to
modify a decree, see Price, "Best Interest" and "Material Change" Factors in Child
Custody and Visitation Modification Suits, 46 TEx. B. J. 1228, 1230-33 (1983).
4. All states require a decision by the court concerning the appropriate custody rule
in each divorce that involves minor children. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West
Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT'ANN. § 61.13 (West Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West
Supp. 1985); N.Y. DOM. REL.LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§
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ness to intervene in the divorced family at any time after divorce
if minor children are involved.8
Most states impose a family structure on divorcing parties
based on the "best interests of the child" evaluation standards
and on a normative principle favoring exclusive custody of children.7 Exclusive custody requires that normally shared parental
rights and duties be given to only one of the parents, leaving the
other parent with a right to visit the child under certain conditions. This result arguably follows the best interests of the child
because of the physical separation of the divorced parents.8
During the past two decades, three significant attacks have
been made on this traditional divorce structure.9 All three have
had as one of their primary objectives the goal of improving the
lives of divorced family members. The most successful attack
was the no-fault divorce movement. Its sweep of the states has
allowed the vast majority of separating parents to terminate
their marriages without the intense divisiveness that often
caused unnecessary bitterness and hatred in the divorced family.10 The second attack was an attempt to provide a simpler and
more workable definition of the best interests of the child
3105.21, 3109.04 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.01(a), 14.07(a)
(Vernon 1975); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600.5(d)-(e), 4603 (West Supp. 1985); FLA STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(1) (West 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.21(8), 598A (West Supp. 1985); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B) (Page
1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.245(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4600(b), 4608 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1), (3) (West Supp. 1985);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.21(A)
(Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1985);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981).
7. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.04(A) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(a)-(b) (Vernon 1975);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(a) (West 1981). Cf. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear
Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 899-902 (1984) (suggesting the existence of a
limited form of nonexclusive parenthood even when sole custody is awarded).
8. Exclusive parental custody has drawn its support principally from both a natural
law or religious base and a functional or instrumental rationale. Bartlett, supra note 7, at
886-93.
9. Professor Jay Folberg refers to only two waves of reform that have swept American
divorce law in recent decades: the no-fault divorce and joint custody movements.
Folberg, Joint Custody Law-The Second Wave, 23 J. FAM. L. 1 (1984-1985). I have
included a third reform movement, the redefinition of the "best interests of the child"
standard, because of its significance in shaping the way courts, attorneys, and parents
view the postdivorce parent-child relationship.
10. See McKnight, Texas Family Code Symposium-Title 1. Husband and Wife, 13
TEx. TECH L. REV. 611, 676-77 (1982).
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standard for custody determinations. 1 This effort has been
partly responsible for the courts' increased focus on three important elements of a child's best interests: continuity, stability,
and the psychological nature of parenting. 2 A third attack has
concentrated on expanding the definition of acceptable custody
patterns to include the sharing of parental responsibility."3 This
joint custody movement has succeeded in popularizing the joint
legal custody model, 4 but acceptance of this model has generally
been restricted to those parents who voluntarily agree to share
the legal rights and duties of parenthood. 6
Problems plague the enforcement of current divorce laws. Divorced families frequently return to court for further battles
over enforcement of the law or the decree, over modification of
the settlement provisions in the face of new circumstances, or
just to vent their anger against a system that distorts their family ties."8 Coercive enforcement of court-ordered custody, sup11.

BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
(1979) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
INTERESTS].

12. See Cole, The Issue of Stability in the Modification of Custody Decisions:Factor
or Determinant?, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1095, 1115-18 (1983-1984); Crouch, An Essay on the

Critical and JudicialReception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q.
49 (1979); Gruenberg & Mackey, A New Direction for Child Custody in Alaska, 6
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 34, 38-40, 49 (1976); The Impact of Psychological Parenting on
Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 483 (1983-1984);
Dembitz, "Beyond the Best Interests of the Child"-A Review and Critique, 29 REc.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 457, 459-60 (1974).
13. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 KY. L.J. 271, 282-88 (1978-1979); Folberg, supra note 9,
at 1-3; Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 359-61 (1979).
14. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(2) (West Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.04(A) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp.
1985). For a review of joint custody provisions in the 32 states that have addressed the
issue, see JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING app. A (J. Folberg ed. 1984), portions
reprinted in Folberg, supra note 9, at 14-55.
15. Folberg, supra note 9, at 14-55 (charting the 32 states that recognize joint custody, including cites to relevant statutes and synopses of recent cases interpreting these
provisions). The primary difference among states that recognize joint custody rests on
whether the parents must agree prior to trial to cooperate on childrearing decisions, or
whether the court can order joint custody at trial based upon an independent assessment
of a general parental willingness to cooperate in the interests of the children. Id. at 2-5.
Several states have established a preference or presumption for the joint custody option.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (1983);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-223 to -224 (1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A) (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21.1 (Supp. 1985).
16. For the first two categories, see generally Annot., 35 A.L.R.4TH 61 (1985 & Supp.
1985) (setting forth cases concerning custody difficulties where the custodial parent has
temporarily and conditionally relinquished custody); Annot., 17 A.L.R.4TH 1013 (1982 &
Supp. 1985) (setting forth cases discussing the factors involved in determining propriety
of joint custody both during the divorce proceeding and after); Annot., 61 A.L.R.3D 657
(1975 & Supp. 1985) (setting forth cases on modification of child support decrees and the
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port, and visitation has become more common1 7 as the number
of divorced families has increased dramatically during the past
decade.' 8 Furthermore, these problems are only the ones that are
visible to the legal system. Much dissatisfaction never reaches
the formal court process or even the lawyer's office and therefore
remains uncounted in our statistics.
Because of the demands of court procedure, the legal system
focuses primarily on the more objective and tangible aspects of
family life in shaping parent-child relationships within the divorced family. 19 Relationship factors such as the psychological
and emotional bonds fundamental to the health of the biological
family are either left out of the decisionmaking process entirely
20
or, at best, are brought in for adversarial or hurtful purposes.
The three reform movements have tried to correct this problem
but have fallen far short of success, partly because of their continued commitment to judicial control.
The goal of the legal system should be to support the development of as positive and nurturing an environment for all members of a divorced family as possible within the behavioral limits
determined by those members. Three questions follow from this
objective: (1) What is the proper role for court adjudication in
determining postdivorce parent-child relationships? (2) Is there
value in applying the traditional concept of family autonomy
within the divorce setting? (3) Can the elements of conflict
among divorced family members be managed in a way more supportive of the psychological needs of the divorced family as a
whole than done at present?
circumstances under which they are brought). Most contested postdivorce cases visually
symbolize the frustration and anger bred by the divorce relationship. I am using the
third category here in a more limited sense to refer to special instances in which the
primary motivation of one party or both is anger or frustration. See, e.g., Ramos v. Ramos, 683 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (mother denied father visitation and father
petitioned for custody on that and other changes in circumstances).
17. See ParentalKidnapping:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, p8th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-30 (1983) (testimony of
Fred Schutzman, Deputy Director, Child Support Enforcement, Dep't of Health and
Human Services); D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 138-61 (1979); Krause, Reflections
on Child Support, 17 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1983).
18. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, ATLAS & YEARBOOK 1985, at 772 (0. Johnson ed.)
(reporting statistics of the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
19. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 368
(1979) ("The proper province of adjudication is to make an authoritative determination
of questions raised by claims of right and accusations of guilt."). Marriage and divorce
relationships are built on a principle of reciprocity, with negotiation as the preferred
mode of participation by the affected party. Id. at 358, 363.
20. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 2-20 (1978); Bartlett, supra
note 7, at 881-82; Bratt, supra note 13, at 296-98; Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to
Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 567-69 (1983-1984); Miller,
supra note 13, at 354-59.
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In this Article, I address these three questions within the
framework provided by the goal to be achieved. Part I outlines
the present system and its problems, discussing both its effects
on divorced family members and the problems inherent in the
exclusive custody rule. Part II builds a proposal for legal reform
by first considering the effect of conflict within the family, then
identifying five value guidelines that should control the relationships, and finally describing the proposal in detail. Part III analyzes the pros and cons of the reform proposal to determine
whether its adoption could establish a healthier environment for
the divorced family.

I.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND ITS PROBLEMS

The present legal system creates adverse effects within the divorced family structure. In studying these effects, I will first contrast the system's treatment of intact families with that given
divorced families, then review the adverse impacts that the exclusive custody concept imposes on postdivorce family members,
and finally outline the effects the divorcing process itself has on
the family members who must use it.
A.

Autonomy versus Intervention

A parent's interest in planning and participating in the rearing of his or her children is a powerful biological instinct. Parents spend enormous resources on the health, education, pleasure, and general activities of their sons and daughters. Without
special invitation, few outsiders dare criticize directly the parental decisions of others or even suggest different methods of
childrearing. The legal system protects family members from
such outside intervention, especially if attempted by the state.2 '
Our society places a high value on parental autonomy and family
22
integrity.
Courts have traditionally avoided handling disputes over parental decisions by granting parents immunity from court en21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit differentiate the idea of parental autonomy from the
more encompassing concept of family integrity, which they define as including parental
autonomy, the right to autonomous parents, and privacy. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS,
supra note 2, at 9 n.*.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 19:3

forcement of claims arising out of family interaction.2 3 Family
members cannot ask the courts to help solve internal arguments.
They must rely on private forms of dispute resolution, such as
negotiation, mediation, or voluntary arbitration. Avoidance and
self-help are also available and are perhaps the methods that are
the least expensive and most frequently used by parents. 4 If a
father stubbornly refuses to negotiate, the mother must either
accept the father's decision or take some unilateral action or inaction that might work toward a solution acceptable to her. In
such daily negotiation games, stubbornness and hostility may
succeed in the short run, but in the long run some more stable
balance must be reached. Linkage of one issue with another may
be one such balancing method. Over the years, most parents
build a reasonably healthy home environment by sharing the
decisionmaking duties among the family members. The inaccessibility of court adjudication forces family members to rely on
themselves for the settlement of internal disputes.
This policy of court unavailability has its costs. Families frequently struggle and fight to arrive at a reasonable balance of
decisionmaking. 25 Demand is high for advice and counsel from
religious leaders, psychologists, marriage counselors, close
friends, and even Ann Landers. Yet few see judicial intervention
in family decisions as a better solution.26 Americans will forego
court involvement in settling family disputes to enjoy the free23. For a brief historical review of the parental immunity doctrine, see Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930-33 (Tex. 1971); Robinson, Joint Custody: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 21 J. FAM. L. 641, 643 n.5 (1982-1983). Some states have recently
allowed suits and recoveries by children against their parents to the extent of any insurance that covered the act. See Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982); Faraj v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 486 A.2d 582 (R.I. 1984). Protecting family harmony and resources constitutes the rationale for protecting parental autonomy. 414 So. 2d at 1067, 1070 (Boyd,
J., dissenting).
24. Education is probably the least noticed and most used form of self-help. Over the
past decades the number of books and articles offering advice to parents about childrearing problems has been and continues to be enormous. See, e.g., H. ANDERSON & G. ANDERSON, MOM AND DAD ARE DIVORCED, BUT I'M NOT (1981); F. DODSON, HOW TO PARENT
(1970); H. GINoTT, BETWEEN PARENT & TEENAGER (1969); F. ILG & L. AMES, CHILD BEHAVIOR (1955); L. SALK, My FATHER, MY SON: INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1982); L. SALK, WHAT
EVERY CHILD WOULD LIKE His PARENTS TO KNOW (1973).
25. See L. ARMSTRONG, THE HOME FRONT: NOTES FROM THE FAMILY WAR ZONE (1983).

26.

The prevailing view favors minimum state interference with family decisionmak-

ing. See, e.g., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 9-12; Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the PsychologicalParentingTheory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 549, 554-55 (1983-1984). But cf. Review Essay, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 179

(1983) (reviewing two books that argue respectively for a reduction in family autonomy
to protect the constitutional rights of weaker members (L. ARMSTRONG, supra note 25)
and to assure more equality for children regardless of family resources (J. FiSHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983))).
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dom and benefit of shaping the development of their own children without outside supervision.
These strong traditions of parental autonomy and family privacy in the intact family do not reach into the divorced home.
Most people expect, and many welcome, judicial intervention in
family decisions during the divorce process for several reasons.2 7
First, government has traditionally monopolized the divorce
process. Two people can marry and raise children with little or
no governmental supervision, 8 but all states carefully oversee
divorces. 29 Even divorce for two adults without minor children
or significant property is a structured and relatively expensive
process.30 In divorces involving larger families and estates, judicial decisions play a dominant role. Moreover, courts do not restrict this intervention to the divorce alone, but declare continuing jurisdiction of the divorced family relationship until all
minor children have become adults.3 1
Second, many spouses decide to seek divorce only after a long
period of chronic marital conflict leading to unhappiness, frus27. Even authors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit welcome court involvement if one of
the parents requests. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 31-33. Commentators
who favor joint custody usually call for as much court involvement as exists now, only
with different standards. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7, at 961-62; Foster & Freed,
Child Custody and the Adversary Process: Forum Conveniences?, 17 FAM. L.Q. 133, 145,
150 (1983); Miller, supra note 13, at 411; Robinson, supra note 23, at 673-79.
28. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia recognize common law marriage, for
which a man and woman need only (1) agree that they are married, (2) live together as
husband and wife, and (3) hold themselves out to the public as being married. Common
law marriage requires no state certification or other intervention. See, e.g., Laws v.
Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1983); In re Estate of Zurbrugg, 34 Ohio Misc. 84, 296
N.E.2d 847 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.11 (West Supp. 1985); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
1.91 (Vernon 1975). Statutory marriage generally requires registration only. Many states
have even eliminated requirements for a physician's examination or a blood test for disease prevention. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 596.1-.8 (1981), repealed by 1982 Iowa
Acts ch. 1152, § 3; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.21-.38 (Vernon 1975), repealed by 1983
Tex. Sess. Laws ch. 493, § 2.
29. An historical explanation for the state monopoly begins with the English tradition in which divorce was handled exclusively by the ecclesiastical courts. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179 (1973), in which the author also points to the
development of common law marriage as a peculiarly American reaction against state
religion. Id. at 179-81. The monopoly has continued to this day probably because American society sees divorce primarily as a pathological disfunction within the community.
See L. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM 284-85 (1980).
30. Most states provide no short cuts to a divorce, but if a couple agrees to a divorce
without contest or long settlement dialogue, the attorney and court time fees can be
significantly reduced. California is experimenting with a simpler "summary dissolution
procedure" for certain couples who have been married less than five years, who waive
any rights to spousal support, and who are without realty, children, or substantial resources. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4550 (West Supp. 1985).
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tration, anger, and bitterness."2 Each spouse wants the state to
intervene to force the other to do what is right. A court decision
is not only a vindication of innocence but also a powerful tool
for enforcing one's will upon another.
Third, a dominant force shaping the development of the
American divorce process3" has been the Judeo-Christian religious experience, which has traditionally equated divorce with
sin and failure. 8 ' Intervention to prevent the tragedy of divorce
or, failing that, to protect innocent victims from harm by the
supposedly guilty parent represents the natural product of this
ecclesiastical tradition.
Lastly, American society has increasingly turned to government intervention and court enforcement as the answer to
problems that threaten the community. Because we consider divorce a problem, new legal restrictions and heavy court involvement are comforting solutions and therefore widely accepted.
In the 1980's, divorcing families are no longer a small minority
within the community as a whole. Over twenty percent of the
married couples in the United States are in their second or later
marriages,3 5 and projections suggest that almost fifty percent of
the marriages performed in any current year will eventually end
in divorce. 6 As the number of divorced families increases, both
in real and percentage terms, pressure is building within society
to recognize and accept the divorced status as legitimate. Although some changes are being made to accommodate these interests, severe problems are still apparent, especially in the area
of postdivorce parent-child relationships. The legal structure has
changed, but not as fast or as radically as the needs of divorced
family members.
B.

The Impact of Exclusive Custody

At the moment of divorce, courts in most states award exclusive custody of the children to one parent. Exclusive custody
32. Broken Families, Pt. 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Family and Human
Services of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77
(1983) (statement of Dr. Herbert S. Sacks, Yale School of Medicine) [hereinafter cited as
Sacks Testimony].
33. For discussion of the history of American marriage and divorce law, see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 179-84; L. HALEM, supra note 29, at 9-26; M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD,
supra note 20, at 22-47.
34. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 179; L. HALuM, supra note 29, at 9-10.
35. Sacks Testimony, supra note 32, at 77.
36. Id. at 79.
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means that one spouse is given the full responsibility of caring
for and raising the children, while the other spouse receives limited rights for periodic visitation. All parental responsibility is
taken from the noncustodial spouse, except that little which is
necessary for him3 7 to function adequately during the limited
38
visitation periods.
Reasons given for imposing this custody framework are based
primarily on perceptions of the stereotypic divorce. 39 Two parents divorce because they no longer want to live together in marriage. They will live apart after the divorce, and therefore when
the children are with one, they are not with the other. In an
ongoing marriage, shared interests between parents are generally
built on the day-to-day requirements of living together, a condition not present in the separated family. Disagreements between
parents who live apart are difficult to resolve by personal negotiation under the best circumstances, and the psychological distance between divorced spouses makes it nearly impossible.
Furthermore, so the argument goes, two parents who cannot
agree to stay together could hardly be expected to agree on how
to raise their children. They would probably even disagree over
the process by which to decide how to raise the children. The
effect of such confusion and conflict would be harmful to the
best interests of the children. The state must therefore predetermine the postdivorce decisionmaking process by giving full authority to only one parent, who can then make the decisions
without delay, argument, or threat of veto.
The exclusive custody rule presents a unique lightning rod for
confrontation between the average divorcing parents.40 One
spouse, normally the mother, receives custody of the children
and is considered the winner; the other spouse, typically the father, receives visitation rights and is considered the loser. The
impact of this rule is often devastating for both parents.4 1
37. Proper gender references are difficult within the confines of acceptable English
prose. I have tried to use either the plural form, they or their, or both genders if singular,
he/she or his/her. When referring to custodial and noncustodial parents, however, I have
taken the liberty of using the pronoun gender most applicable: female for custodian,
male for noncustodian.
38. Compare statutory provisions outlining the parental rights and duties of custodians with those outlining the rights and duties of noncustodians. See, e.g., OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 3109.04-.05 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.02.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(d) (West 1981).

39.

See

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 11, at 17.

40. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 644-50. A recent legal treatise on custody written
for the father includes a chapter appropriately entitled, "You're at War, Buddy." M.
FRANKS, WINNING CUSTODY 31 (1983).
41. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 73-83; Miller, supra note 13, at
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The mother, the custody "winner," soon becomes burdened
with the work of raising the children alone. She is frequently
trying to learn, relearn, or obtain a paying job to support a separate household and new lifestyle as well as take care of the children. Money often is a scarce commodity. She may quickly become overworked, frustrated, bitter and vengeful, especially as
she watches the more carefree and financially secure life her former husband now lives. In response to this apparent inequity,
the mother may take her emotional frustrations out on the children or her friends, she may make frequent demands for higher
support payments or altered visitation times, she may build obstacles to the father's exercise of his visitation rights, or she may
try in some other way to punish the father for not accepting
what she perceives as his share of parental responsibility in the
divorced family.48 Exclusive custody effectively isolates the
mother as a parent 44 and gives her a nearly impossible task to
accomplish without assistance.
The father, on the other hand, has had an almost unbridgeable gap placed between him and his children.45 No longer a par354-59; Robinson, supra note 23, at 644-50.
42. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 74-80.
43. See id. at 75.
44. Some courts have referred to the custodial parent and the children as the "new
family unit," thereby symbolizing and extending that parent's isolation through language
usage. In D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (Ch. Div.),
aft 'd per curiarn, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976), the New Jersey
Superior Court stated:
The children, after the parents' divorce or separation, belong to a different family unit than they did when the parents lived together. The new family unit
consists only of the children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous
to that unit as a whole, to each of its members individually and to the way they
relate to each other and function together is obviously in the best interests of
the children. It is in the context of what is best for that family unit that the
precise nature and terms of visitation and changes in visitation by the noncus-

todial parent must be considered.
45. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 2-5, 74-75, 80-82; Child Custody Disputes and ParentalKidnapping:A Conference Report, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1983,
at 32. Attorney and author Maurice Franks describes this gap most poignantly in his

introduction:
[I]s the divorce over? Have you just discovered that your children are slipping
away from you emotionally because being with them for only two hours a week
doesn't even give them time to get to know you before you have to leave again?
Have you gone to your lawyer to try to get more time with your children, and
has he told you that you were lucky to get the time you have with the kids?
Are you feeling agony and frustration because of a system that deprives you of
the right to raise your own children? Are you feeling some degree of fear that
your children will be mistreated or ignored or allowed to run wild without your
guiding hand and advice? In regard to raising your children, do you feel as if
you're in a boxing match where you have to wear a black bag over your head and
the other guy doesn't?
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ent in the usual sense, he has no right or obligation to participate meaningfully in the childrearing process. All decisions
affecting the children are for the mother to make, and unless she
includes the father in her deliberations, he is shut out completely. He retains only the right to visit the children, a right
that the actions and emotions of the custodial mother and the
children can often effectively control. Furthermore, the visitation periods set by courts or through the settlement process
rarely allow for normal parent-child interaction." In addition,
the court may order the father to make periodic payments for
support of the children, but neither the court nor the mother
nor the children must account for the money received. Intact
family members rarely allow such unaccountability for family income and expense.
As a result of living with this situation, a father may lose interest in trying to maintain or, more accurately, reestablish each
week a parental relationship with his children.4 7 His visits become more sporadic and less satisfying to all concerned-child,
father, and mother. Because he has few parental rights or duties,
child support payments become more like fees paid for the right
to visit the children. He may therefore reduce his support payments unilaterally as he reduces visitation, or begin making payments late, or miss them altogether."8 He may return to court in
an attempt to have custody changed from the mother to himself.
In a few cases he might kidnap his children and try to establish
a family by excluding the mother.49
C.

The Effect of the Divorce Process

The impersonal nature of the divorce process compounds the
detrimental effects of the exclusive custody rule. Once into the
I know it's not much consolation, but you're not alone. There are millions of
men in the same boat in America today.
M. FRANKS, supra note 40, at 15.
46. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 5, 14-15.
47. Id.
48. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 17, at 106-07, 121-38.
49. A brief interchange between the Chairman of a Senate subcommittee and a U.S.
Department of Justice official is illuminating:
Senator Specter. What are the consequences of parental kidnapping? Does
that situation customarily find danger for the child or abuse of the child?
Mr. Lippe. No, not necessarily.. . . [Als often as not, the abducting parent is
a kind, loving parent who is doing this out of love for the child.
ParentalKidnapping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. 6-7 (1983).
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process, both parents find that their family decisions, which
were always unique and private, are now judged by societal
standards imbedded in state codes and interpreted by hundreds
of judges in cases involving thousands of unknown families. In
addition, they are faced with substantial financial, time, and
emotional costs in order to make the legal process work well."
Many are unable or unwilling to pay these heavy costs to
achieve a divorce relationship more closely tuned to their personal interests or values.
Moreover, the divorce process itself relegates the spouses to
roles of spectators: The lawyers are the activists, albeit as advocates of the spouses, and most of the players within the
process-the judge, psychologist, friends, or relatives-reinforce
the central role that the legal advocates play. Finally, because a
substantial number of child support payments are now channeled through the court or automatically deducted from
paychecks or tax refunds,51 the distance between the noncustodial parent and his children increases even as these methods
make support easier to pay, reinforce the separation of such payments from the visitation right, and provide financial protection
for the mother.
Whether parents go through a contested custody hearing or
settle their differences by a negotiated agreement, the same impersonal, win-lose rules dominate the process.2 For the lawyernegotiator or the judge, a spouse's rights under applicable law
define the divorced family relationship; any proposed deviation
must be rationally and explicitly justified. This legalistic and impersonal structure does nothing to encourage attempts by divorced family members to maintain caring parent-child
relationships.
After having passed through such a foreign system, many divorced parents develop informal patterns of communication and
decisionmaking which may relate only remotely to what the lawyers, the court, or the law dictated. These parents, in effect,
reassert the same family autonomy within their postdivorce environment that they enjoyed during their marriage, but without
the support of judicial recognition. For these families, the estab50. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 956-57, 971-72 (1979).
51.

See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.21(B) (Page Supp. 1984) (requiring all

child support payments ordered after April 15, 1985 to be deducted from earnings unless
there is specific court action to exempt the obliger).
52. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 968-71, 977-84.
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lished divorce process constitutes one more obstacle in their
path toward achieving a healthy postdivorce relationship.

II. A

PROPOSAL: TOWARD CONSISTENCY IN THE LEGAL NATURE
OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

A reform proposal that helps divorced parents and their children cope with the adverse impact of the divorce process can
develop out of an understanding of relationship factors common
to both intact and divorced families. This Part builds and describes such a proposal in three steps: first, by reconsidering basic assumptions about conflict within the family context, then by
identifying five controlling value guidelines for healthy family
relationships, and finally, by developing a proposed legal framework that would encourage and support such relationships.
A.

The Constructive Role of Conflict

One of the elements common to both intact and divorced families is the existence of internal conflict. By viewing such conflict
as inherent to and often constructive for human relationships,
we can build a useful reform proposal.
Professionals in many social sciences have considered conflict
not only as normal in human relationships but also as a potential creative force in both human and societal terms.5 3 Conflict
often forces people to face current problems in a way requiring
choices for a better future. The existence of disagreements and
disputes can be an indication of health rather than of disease in
any community, organization, or family, and the attempt to
eliminate all conflict may have serious byproducts that could
cost the opportunity for a better future.
Some of the benefit of conflict resides in the impact of the
conflict resolving process itself. Resolving conflict by consensual
means requires participation; it is not a spectator sport. Direct
participation in developing workable solutions to disputes encourages a greater commitment to implementing the provisions
of those solutions. 54 Furthermore, active involvement in resolv1

53.

For a small sampling of the literature, see M. DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973) (psychologist); R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING To YES (1981) (lawyer and
anthropologist); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) (business economist); T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (economist and international
affairs theorist).

54.

McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance
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ing problems reinforces the personal sense of accomplishment
and self-worth essential to a healthy family and community life.
Voluntary, participatory, and consensual mechanisms for dispute resolution are useful in the management of conflict, but the
extent to which these processes should be encouraged to the exclusion of the courts and lawyers is controversial." First, there is
the question of protecting the legal rights of participants. When
the courts control, or when negotiation is practiced in "the
shadow of the law, '' 6 as when lawyers perform this service during the divorce process, the rights of individuals are protected
by the procedural and substantive rules of the justice system.
Fairness is defined as due process in handling the recognized legal disputes. Legal standards provide the necessary procedural
protection for all parties in conflict.5 7 On the other hand, a lawyer, psychologist, or other professional who performs mediation
places substantial emphasis on the psychological and relational
factors present. In mediation, the substantive and procedural
law is recognized as being only one of many different standards
by which the parties measure a proposed solution's fairness and
wisdom. Protection for parties comes from their individual responsibility as competent adults and from the voluntariness of
the process, not from the imposition of outside rules.
A second reason for controversy rests on the nature of law itself. For the lawyer, the law constitutes the most appropriate
standard for parties who have been unable to solve their differences by themselves. Our legal system is based on a recognition
of the individualistic and competitive nature of society. From
the mediation perspective, however, reliance on substantive law,
with its clear-cut rights and duties, frequently presents an obThrough Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 11, 45-47 (1984); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Oio ST. L.J. 29, 33 (1982).
55. Encouraging alternative processes: R. COULSON, FIGHTING FAIR (1983); R. FISHER
& W. URY, supra note 53, at 51-60; Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274
(1982); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976). Limiting alternative processes: Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Nader, Disputing
Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE LJ. 900 (1979); Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on Justice for the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569
(1979); Woods, Child Support: A National Disgrace, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 538 (1983).
56. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 950.

57.

Even lawyers who support a shared parent responsibility approach often remain

committed to a process controlled by the courts. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 944-46; Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 477, 558-68 (1984); Foster & Freed, supra note 27, at 145-50; Kapner, Joint Custody and Shared ParentalResponsibility: An Examination of Approaches in Wisconsin
and Florida, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 674-76, 687-91 (1983); Robinson, supra note 23, at
650-51, 673-74, 685.
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stacle to producing wise solutions to human conflict.5 8 Human
conflict involves personal relationship patterns, and divorce law
does not reflect the legitimacy and importance of these patterns.
Legal negotiation will therefore not adequately recognize those
patterns either. By permitting consideration of all relevant value
systems on a more equal basis, the mediation approach is more
sensitive to the demands of the entire conflict and can provide a
solution more consistent with the parties' natural behavioral
patterns.

59

Recent studies of conflict by physical scientists help clarify
the controversy in the social sciences. Researchers are discovering a natural transition in physical behavior from order into
chaos and back again. 60 "Sensitive dependence on initial conditions" constitutes the fundamental concept underlying this new
chaos theory.6 With this concept as a base, scientists have discovered several uniform channels by which different matter
moves from a stable condition toward chaos. They have concluded that order itself contains within it the seeds of its own
movement into a more disrupted or chaotic state. The impact of
specific outside pressures will release these "seeds" in a way
uniquely related to those initial conditions. The transitions between order and chaos are to that limited extent predictable and
uniform for different physical phenomena.62
The scientific studies are useful in shaping a theoretical view
of the behavioral dynamics of human conflict. An application of
chaos theory would suggest that movement from harmony to
58.
(1971);

See Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 331-34

see also P.

NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RE-

16, 53-54 (1978) (suggesting that the nature of modern law can be described as "autonomous," with the goal of legitimation achieved by a system of procedural fairness, strict and elaborate rules, coercive legal restraints and formal access). The
contrast of "autonomous" law with what Nonet and Selznick call "responsive" law suggests a failure on the part of the modern legal system to recognize the importance of the
integration of law and social relationships. Id. at 73-74, 90-94.
59. See Fuller, supra note 58, at 322-30; Riskin, supra note 54, at 34-35.
60. See Gleick, Solving the Mathematical Riddle of Chaos, N.Y. Times, June 10,
1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, 32; Wolf, Simplicity and Universality in the Transition to
Chaos, NATURE, Sept. 15, 1983, at 182; see also Maddox, Chaos Theory Infects Civil
Engineers, NATURE, July 14, 1983, at 115; The Mathematics of Mayhem, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 8, 1984, at 87; Peterson, Pathways to Chaos, ScI. NEWS, July 30, 1983, at 76.
61. Gleick, supra note 60, at 32; The Mathematics of Mayhem, supra note 60, at 87.
Pioneering work on chaos theory in physics has been done by Dr. Mitchell Feigenbaum
of Cornell University. He identified regular patterns in the way different equations reacted during the transition from order to disorder. His calculations of those regular patterns are called the Feigenbaum numbers. Gleick, supra note 60, at 32, 44. The aim of
Dr. Feigenbaum's work was to study "the borderline between organized behavior and
chaotic behavior." Id. at 32.
62. See supra note 60.
SPONSIVE LAW
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conflict in either an intact or divorced family should be predictable to some limited extent through an assessment of the initial
conditions of the relationships involved. Chaos theory's emphasis on a "sensitivity to initial conditions" translates in human
behavioral terms into a focus on the personalities, attitudes, values, and activities existing within the family. Any legal structure
not respecting these internal relationship patterns will not assist
a family in developing a postdivorce environment compatible
with its basic nature.
Our legal structure already recognizes that conflict within the
intact family is natural, healthy, and often creative. Family autonomy is respected and protected."3 Why should the divorced
family be different? The fluctuations between harmony and conflict within the family and the varying levels of conflict intensity
generally follow certain established patterns, which are more or
less predictable once the personalities, attitudes, internal relationships, and nature of oft-recurring outside pressures are
known. Regardless of marital status, the family remains a psychological fact of community life, and interaction of its members
is no less important because the parents are physically separated
and divorced than if they remain within an ongoing marriage.
The activity of family members within a relationship theoretically reflects a natural and dynamic balance of stability and conflict. At any one time such a balance carries within it the seeds
of both change and a new balance. The family relationship benefits from its members struggling through each successive stage of
conflict and balance. Any legal system that channels family behavior or structure in an artificially uniform direction creates
forces that will alter the accepted pattern or conflict. Therefore,
in evaluating various proposals for legal reform, the impact that
an outside structure has on the values and disputing patterns of
family members should be given special attention.
For example, such an evaluation was done during the 1960's in
reviewing the impact of fault divorce laws on spouses and the
need for a different approach to spousal breakup." It is not sur63.
64.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-2, 21-23.
See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE FAMILY, 1966 REPORT; UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979); Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform,
42 U. COLO. L. REV. 403, 407-09, 418 (1971); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without
Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 35-41, 81-87 (1966).
Commentators recognized that fault grounds were unrelated to the internal relationship patterns of spouses seeking divorce. Divorce was a form of punishment the innocent
spouse inflicted on the spouse who committed certain carefully defined harmful acts,
such as cruelty, adultery, or abandonment. The refusal to grant the offending spouse a
divorce also served as a punishment. Relationship patterns within the family were irrele-
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prising that the fault structure created an unnatural environment for continued family interaction after divorce. Divorce law
forced family members to focus on the past, identifying and
proving specific legal faults that occurred in the old relationship.
These laws caused harmful and unstable patterns of family interaction before, during, and after the divorce. Adoption of a nofault divorce process by the early 1970's was recognition of the
need to permit a more natural transition for spouses. 65
No-fault reform did not alter reliance on the traditional structure of custody, which still attached to parent-child relationships at divorce. Exclusive custody continued to make the personal relationship values of the family irrelevant to the legal
decisions shaping parent-child interaction within the divorced
family.
During the past decade, parents, expert commentators, and
legislators have endorsed the concept of joint custody as an alternative to exclusive custody. 6' Recent research has pointed to
vant to this formal legal inquiry, except as they might give an innocent spouse more
bargaining power if he or she were willing to use them as weapons. The divorce process,
for those who dared try it, was either a bitter, divisive path that did little to help
postdivorce family members work together, or a carefully choreographed play by the two
spouses in an attempt to meet the formal requirements of the law without destroying
desired relationship patterns. Children were either left out of the process or were subject
to the legal presumptions and jury biases surrounding the proof of fault.
65. In 1985, South Dakota became the last state to include a no-fault ground in its
divorce law. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (Supp. 1985). New York limits its no-fault
provision to those cases in which the spouses agree; in contested cases fault grounds
must be alleged and proven. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §.170 (McKinney 1977).
66. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 149, 173; Miller, supra note 13, at
359-66, 379-83. The methods used to implement the joint custody concept have encouraged diversity and experimentation among the states. One of the negative side effects has been a steady growth of conditions limiting joint custody, some well-intentioned and others not. A recent example, though somewhat extreme, is a bill filed by
Representative Robert Bush in the 1985 Texas House of Representatives. The bill establishes a presumption in favor of joint custody, but lists a sizable array of restrictive conditions for its application:
Sec. 14.011. APPOINTMENT OF JOINT MANAGING CONSERVATORS.
(a) The appointment of joint managing conservators is presumed to be in the
best interests of the child, and both parents of the child may be named as joint
managing conservators of the child only if:
(1) both parents have agreed in writing to an order of joint managing conservatorship and have filed the agreement with the court having jurisdiction of the
suit;
(2) the agreement assigns and apportions between the parents, solely, concurrently, or jointly, all of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent as
provided by Section 12.04 of this code, and expressly states the rights and duties
of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care, residence,
and education;
(3) both parents reside within the jurisdiction of the court and have stated in
the agreement that each intends to remain within the jurisdiction of the court
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the psychological needs of children to have both natural parents
deeply involved in their lives. 7 Joint custody was proposed as an
answer to these needs by providing a more evenly balanced
physical custody schedule and by expecting the parents to share
the responsibility for making major decisions affecting the children's upbringing. A majority of states recognize joint custody in
one legal form or another. 8
Joint custody reforms have produced mixed results. First,
many states limit the concept to only those cases in which the
divorcing parents demonstrate that they can get along well together.0 e Therefore, joint custody in most cases is open only to
indefinitely;
(4) the agreement includes provisions to minimize disruption of the child's
schooling, daily routine, and association with friends; and
(5) the agreement was entered into voluntarily and knowingly by each party.
(b) Joint managing conservatorship may be awarded in other cases only if the
court finds it to be in the best interests of the child. In considering the best
interests of a child under this section, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(1) the suitability and circumstances of each parent;
(2) the ability of the parents to communicate and give first priority to the
child's welfare in such a way as to be capable of reaching shared decisions in the
child's best interests;
(3) the similarity of the environments of each parent's home;
(4) the identity of the primary caretaker of the child before the filing of the
suit;
(5) whether the physical, psychological, or emotional needs and development
of the child will benefit from the appointment of joint managing conservators;
(6) whether each parent can encourage and accept a loving relationship between the child and the other parent; and
(7) other relevant factors.
H.R. 175, 69th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1985).
67. Davis, supra note 20, at 567-72; Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit's Proposals:An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 485,
492-94 (1983-1984).
68. Folberg, supra note 9, at 1; Miller, supra note 13, at 374-82.
69. See, e.g., Bliss ex rel. Ach v. Ach, 56 N.Y.2d 995, 439 N.E.2d 349, 453 N.Y.S.2d
633 (1982). In Bliss the New York Court of Appeals stated:
Although the trial court awarded primary custody to the mother, it also provided for joint custody in the two parents, based upon a finding that the parties
were capable of cooperating to jointly raise the child and to provide for his needs
as a common enterprise. We agree with the Appellate Division, however, that the
existence of sharp differences between the parties makes an award of joint custody inappropriate. Such shared responsibility for and control of the child's upbringing is not properly ordered where, as here, the parents have evidenced an
inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child ....
Id. at 996, 439 N.E.2d at 350, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (citation omitted).
The New York Court of Appeals apparently identified this rule as a matter of law.
Note, however, that the court does not preclude an order of joint custody in all cases in
which parents cannot agree. See Jones v. Jones, 92 A.D.2d 632, 459 N.Y.S.2d 946 (App.
Div. 1983), where there was sufficient evidence of cooperation between the parents to
support joint custody, but the mother received primary physical custody.
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divorcing families that could and probably would have established such a cooperative arrangement informally under the exclusive custody norm. Second, courts in many jurisdictions have
been reluctant, if not hostile, to ordering joint custody when the
parties cannot reach agreement on a sharing arrangement prior
to the hearing. 70 Third, parents who are trying joint custody are
discovering that as each year progresses, problems develop that
71
are unsolvable by joint custodians without resort to the courts.
Fourth, parties continue to look to the courts as the final arbiter
of their differences, with the ever-present option of requesting
exclusive custody should one or both of the parties become dissatisfied, frustrated, or unreconciled.72
Lastly, although several states have established a presumption
of joint parental responsibility at the time of divorce,7 3 there is
as yet little relevant appellate court review or empirical research
evaluating the experience to determine whether it promotes a
more universal sharing of responsibility. 74 Even in these states,
courts remain active in structuring the lives of divorced family
members to meet state-selected criteria. 75 The continued importance of judicial decisionmaking reinforces the conclusion that
joint custody is simply another legal category created to channel
divorced family members, their relationships, and activities in a
socially acceptable but artificial direction rather than to permit
family members to develop natural interaction patterns.
70. See, e.g., Vineyard v. Wilson, 597 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (interpreting
strictly the requirement set forth in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
that a joint custody order must be supported by a separate written agreement of the
parties reflecting mutual consent at the time of the court order).
71. Miller, supra note 13, at 399-400. Miller refers to the primary problems of money,
schedules for holidays, birthdays and vacations, and the childrearing issues of discipline,
diet, after-school activities, and parental permissiveness. The author suggests that a major cause of conflict is often an inadequate divorce agreement that does not provide for
the foreseeable areas of controversy. Id. at 399.
72. Id. at 400.
73. See supra note 15.
74. Existing commentary and analysis do not rely upon either empirical data or a
significant number of appellate court opinions. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7; Kapner,
supra note 57.
75. The best interests of the child and the agreement of the parents are the prerequisites to joint custody most often used by these states. JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING, supra note 14, app. A. Louisiana and Michigan provide a more detailed list
of standards, including whether the parents can cooperate and agree concerning important decisions affecting the child's welfare, submission of a comprehensive plan for implementing joint custody, and a multipart test for the best interests of the child standard. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23
(West 1984).
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Guidelines for Healthy Postdivorce Family Relationships

The existence of conflict within the divorced family is not a
surprising or even necessarily unhealthy circumstance. Family
decisionmaking conflict remains normal and within certain limits76 serves as a favorable educational experience for children.
Such constructive conflict probably cannot be suppressed without unpredictable and perhaps seriously detrimental results.
The nature and intensity of the conflict are important variables. Any situation reflecting dynamic balance between harmony and conflict based upon the existing mix of personality
and behavioral traits among divorced family members should be
a stable and desirable family system. The limit is reached when
the nature or intensity of the conflict constitutes patterns of
abuse, neglect, or other physically or mentally harmful conduct,
which is as unacceptable in the divorced family setting as it is
within the intact family.
Because of wide acceptance of the principle of parental autonomy, intact families are permitted broad latitude in developing
their own interactive patterns free from state intervention. This
Article's primary thesis is that a state should be able to create a
divorce process allowing family members the opportunity to
continue natural and dynamic patterns for its parent-child
relationships.
The following five propositions incorporate relationship values
that are essential to a healthy family environment:
(1) The strength of the biological family as a societal institution lies in its status as a single unit. In principle, geographic
location, marital status, or degree of conflict, within limits,
among family members should make no difference in the support our legal system provides for the familial bond. 7
76. The limits include parental acts or omissions that abuse or neglect the child, or
increase significantly the medical risks to the life of the child, or obstruct the child's
access to educational benefits, or demonstrate an inability to prevent the child from acting in a way to harm the community. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at
59-109 (setting forth limits of gross failures of parental care and refusal to authorize
lifesaving medical care). One commentator takes an even stricter view of the limits that
should attach. Guggenheim, supra note 26, at 554-55 (stating that intervention should
occur "only to protect children from imminent risk of death or disfigurement").
77. See Davis, supra note 20, at 567, 569. In Mead, Anomalies in American
Postdivorce Relationships,in DIVORCE AND AFTER 97 (P. Bohannan ed. 1970), the author
states: "Another confusion in our present attitudes toward divorce and remarriage comes
from our refusal to treat the coconception and production of a child as an unbreakable
tie between the parents, regardless of the state of the marriage contract." Id. at 108.
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(2) Sensitivity to the initial conditions7 8 peculiar to each family as a unit represents the key to understanding a family's activities. Initial conditions are the personality, attitudes, values,
and activities of each member and the behavioral patterns these
traits shape among the members.
(3) The family in divorce should continue operating as a unit
to create the best opportunity for healthy childrearing experiences. Legal and social structures should support that family
within the parameters set by the initial conditions of its
members.79
(4) Minimum state intervention in the decisions and activities
within family units promotes a natural environment for individual family growth.8 0
(5) Consensual dispute resolution is the most effective process
for family decisionmaking, whether the family is intact, separated, or divorced. 81 Each family develops the dynamics of its
own process by the impact of economic and social realities on its
unique initial conditions.
The current legal structure for divorcing families supports
none of these five guiding values. In most states, from the moment the divorce petition is filed, the family faces the divisiveness inherent in the judicial system and the threat the exclusive
custody concept poses. Throughout the proceedings, whether
successfully negotiated in settlement or contested at trial, parents and children are required to fit their actions into various
legally designed criteria that have little reference to the peculiar
individual psychology or joint interaction patterns existing
within that family unit. Moreover, the underlying assumption of
the law and our society is that through divorce the family unit is
dissolved, and two new and separate households are created.
There is never any question about the court's authority to control the structure of the family in divorce, even if the two parents agree on all essential issues. For a state, the impending divorce alone justifies intervention in the family and supervision
of the parent-child relationships. Parental agreement is a factual
detail to be brought to the court's attention at the hearing. Finally, states hold courts ultimately accountable for the structure
78.

79.

See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

See Bohannan, Some Thoughts on Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE AND AFTER, supra
note 77, at 249, 251-52; Grana, Post-Divorce Counseling: A Process for Implementing
the Role of Separate-but-JointParent, 21 J. FAM. L. 687, 696-98 (1982-1983).
80. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 4-5, 9-13; Guggenheim, supra note
26, at 554-55.
81. See R. COULSON, supra note 55, at 163-64; Grana, supra note 79, at 697-701.
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of decisionmaking in the divorced family and do not recognize
the consensual method of dispute resolution as a legitimate final
process in the divorce setting as they do in the ongoing marriage.
These counterproductive effects of the current system suggest
three important conclusions. First, an exclusive custody order or
any other court order fixing a structure for parental responsibility represents an obstacle that family members must surmount
to achieve a divorce environment sensitive to their initial conditions. Second, the best interests of the child test, by not recognizing the legitimacy of the divorced family as a unit, fails to
accept the realities or psychological dynamics within the
postdivorce environment. Third, court intervention and supervision norms chill the growth of healthy interaction among divorced family members.
These conclusions touch three areas in the divorce process: the
court's determination of custody, the application of the best interests of the child standard, and the presence of continuous judicial oversight. Each must change to produce conditions allowing the divorced family to develop in as natural a way as
possible to support the healthy growth of its children. Continuing the present reform process by trying to make minor improvements in present law in response to these legitimate complaints constitutes one answer. Adopting a new legal reform by
bringing consistency to the treatment of family responsibilities,
regardless of marital status,"2 may represent a more workable
solution.
C.

The Proposal

I propose that for purposes of parent-child relationships the
law treat the divorced family the same way it treats the intact
82. In his 1979 book, Professor Chambers develops a substantially different proposal
for reform. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 17, at 279-80. Based on the steady decrease in noncustodial parent interest after the first year of separation, id. at 276, he suggests that
after a transitional period, three years or one-half the length of the marriage, whichever
is longer, the support obligation should become voluntary and optional at the discretion
of the noncustodial parent, and the right of visitation should be optional at the discretion of the custodial parent. Id. at 279-80. The problem with the Chambers proposal is
that it does not recognize the permanent obligation that both parents incur together by
bringing a baby into the world. See Bohannan, supra note 79, at 251; Mead, supra note
77. Recognition of this permanent responsibility represents one of the principal objectives underlying the current effort to establish a presumption in favor of joint parental
responsibility, but the courts' continued presence and control appear to block any hope
of attaining it. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 990-96 (discussing the role
of courts in divorce).
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family.a To state it differently, a legal divorce should no longer
control in shaping parental rights and duties toward children.
The proposal's effect would be far-reaching. First, adjustments
in parental responsibility would not be an issue for court determination upon divorce or thereafter. Parents in divorce would
continue to share general parental rights and duties as co-equals
under the law the same as during the ongoing marriage. Parental
control patterns would change because of the divorce, but this
change would take place through consensual processes, for the
most part, rather than by court dictate. Courts would no longer
determine legal custody, exclusive, joint, or otherwise.
Two significant issues for postdivorce parent-child relationships would remain: determining when the children would be
physically present with each parent, and determining the financial need of the children and allocating that need between the
parents. These issues are more amenable than the issue of legal
custody to resolution by consensual problem-solving methods
such as negotiation and mediation. If the parties are unable to
reach agreement voluntarily, these issues are suitable for
mandatory arbitration that is more informal, efficient, and flexible than court proceedings. Although the arbitration would be
mandatory, the procedures and standards applied could be
shaped by agreement of the participants. Court adjudication
8 4
would be unnecessary.
Second, the best interests of the child standard would require
modification. At present, it is an evaluation tool comparing a
child's possible life in the mother's sole custody with one in the
father's, and with one in joint custody for those states having
that option,8 5 so that the court can choose among the alternatives. If this proposal were adopted, the family would not divide
along parental responsibility lines. Each parent would remain
fully and jointly responsible for his or her children. The choices
are more limited in scope and relate only to the time of a child's
physical presence within each parent's household and the alloca83. Mnookin and Kornhauser appear to support a similar proposal when they state:
"We believe divorcing parents should be given considerable freedom to decide custody
matters - subject only to the same minimum standards for protecting the child from
neglect and abuse that the state imposes on all families." Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 50, at 957 (emphasis in original). Yet those authors backed away from this statement's implications in their conclusion. Id. at 995-96. See also Canacakos, Joint Custody
as a Fundamental Right, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING, supra note 14, at
223, 232-34; Chambers, supra note 57, at 569; Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce
Custody Disputes, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 419 (1985).
84. Kapner, supra note 57, at 675-76, 690-91.
85. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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tion of financial support. The optimum result for these issues is
a schedule and allocation supporting the best parent-child relationships possible within the divorced family as a unit. Therefore, the appropriate standard shifts from a comparative "best
interests of the child" to the supportive "best interests of the
divorced family." The parties, not the court, would apply this
standard through negotiation and mediation, or at the extreme,
an arbitrator would use it to set schedules and allocation levels.
It would not be a tool for a win-lose court decision.
Third, courts would be unavailable to divorced parents, just as
they are to parents within intact families,8 6 as decisionmakers of
last resort in disputes over childrearing issues. Courts would remain available for complaints involving alleged abuse, neglect,
delinquency, or other gross failure of parental care87 regardless
of the marital status of the parent, and a termination of parental
rights action would continue to be an avenue of last resort.
Intact and divorced family structures do not always differ significantly. In the divorced family, parents live in separate residences. The kind of routine daily contact that builds important
psychological family bonds is absent. Yet these structural realities may not translate into stereotypical antagonism or psychological distance. Many divorced parents enjoy substantial family
cooperation and active participation in their children's activities.88 For its part, the perceived unity in the intact family may
often be a misperception. An "intact" family may harbor a mixture of parental separation, violent disagreement, and parentchild confusion. 9 Any general descriptions of parental interaction within the two structures may be so fraught with exceptions
and special cases that they become inappropriate, or worse,
counterproductive as guides for community response.
The imagination, ingenuity, commitment, and adaptability of
the average parents, married or divorced, exceed society's ability
to create role models within which to confine them. Because of
the exclusive family structures provided for divorce, divorced
parents have never been given the full authority or responsibility to establish their own family relationships. Society and the
courts have presumed that such parents could never be fully
See supra text accompanying notes 1-2, 21-23.
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 59-109.
88. See H. ANDERSON & G. ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 245-54 (reprinting the statements of children within divorced families that resemble the close interacting structure
found in some intact families).
89. This divisive reality may be especially dominant in the families that are building
toward divorce, a process that may last years. Sacks Testimony, supra note 32, at 77.
86.
87.
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trusted to act responsibly. The fact that many divorced families
have established their own environment in spite of the law does
not make such a presumption more acceptable. Current legislative activity creating new and more complicated role restrictions
and coercive enforcement measures reinforces the lack of parental responsibility and family autonomy in the divorce process.
The adoption of this Article's proposal would free parents from
these restrictive rules and permit them to develop natural and
unique parent-child relationships in the divorce setting.
This proposal would create a very different environment for
divorcing families. Financial, psychological, and structural pressures of the divorce process, including the personal preferences
and biases of local lawyers, judges, and jury members, 0 currently determine the allocation of parental responsibilities
within the divorced family. Under the proposal the allocation of
specific duties within the divorced family setting would be the
shared task of the mother, father, and children alone, the same
as it is within the ongoing marriage. The allocation may be considerably different in divorce than it was during marriage, but it
will continue to be a function of the personalities, attitudes,
lifestyles, and relationships of the two parents and their children. Divorced parents may openly negotiate how they would divide the duties and decisions of parenthood, or consciously decide to share these obligations under a more flexible and
unstated set of guidelines, or develop a relationship pattern
more or less unconsciously as their personalities and the needs
demand. The possible permutations are unlimited in recognition
of the uniqueness of each family.
If the divorced family is treated more like the intact family,
the two parents would be expected to develop patterns of behavior as their interests, activities, locations, and the physical presence of the children might require. The legal fact of divorce
would have little impact on the resulting parent-child relationships, which would be primarily determined by the practical realities involved in physically separating the lives of the parents.
The legal structure would be neutral. It would accommodate the
variety of human behavior.

90. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 20, at 7-13; Davis, supra note 20, at 558-59;
Miller, supra note 13, at 352-54.
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THE PROPOSAL'S IMPACT

A proposal so different from the way parent-child relationships in the divorced family are currently handled requires careful analysis to determine the possible effects of its adoption.
This Part looks first at the positive effects that would result and
then at the potential problems.
A.

Positive Effects

This Article's proposal to remove the divorced parent-child relationship from court dictate and supervision, if uniformly
adopted by the states, would produce seven significant positive
results.
First, it would endorse a voluntary and participatory process
for resolving family differences. Parents would establish their
own division of responsibilities without threat of court intervention. They would be encouraged, or more accurately, forced to
participate in making their own arrangements for childrearing
because the court would be unavailable as an alternative forum
to resolve internal disputes. For scheduling of child presence
and allocation of financial support, mandatory arbitration would
be the forum of last resort, and the standards to be applied by
the arbitrator would be flexible enough to take into account the
special conditions of the family as a single unit. The parental
relationship would no longer be a function of legal or judicial
direction but of the personal characteristics of the divorced family members themselves.
At present, each divorced parent knows that, subject to certain financial and emotional costs, he or she can go to court for
legal relief if things are not to his or her liking. Negotiation
within such an environment encourages parties to focus on their
exclusive rights and to threaten court action if the other side
does not give in. The results of negotiations in that context are
often distorted in ways that place a premium on stubbornness,
selfishness, and a risk-prone nature.9 1 Such a system fails to pro91. For discussions of these and other factors that affect the negotiation process, see
R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 53, at 12; C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 62-63
(1970); H. RAIFFA, supra note 53, at 76-77. See also White, Machiavelli and the Bar:
Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926, 928
("[T]o conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about one's true settling
point, is the essence of negotiation.").
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mote wise, durable, and fair decisions.92 The proposal would correct this.
Second, divorcing parents would become ultimately responsible for determining the best interests of their children. Current
law requires the court to be accountable for the child's best interests at divorce. In the typical contested case, the court initially decides the child's best interests and then delegates the
continuing responsibility to one of the spouses as sole custodian,
always remaining available to review that delegation or the custodial decisions until the child becomes an adult. Custody hearings normally focus on contrasting the past and present lifestyle,
abilities, and faults of the spouses as individuals and as parents.9 3 The child often remains a shadowy figure, even if a
guardian ad litem is appointed. The order giving custody to one
spouse over the other may represent the thoughtful judgment of
the jury members or the judge, but it can only represent their
subjective decision based on information presented by the parties' lawyers during a limited trial period. The deeply held family beliefs and experiences of judge and juror form the basis for
their subjectivity. Although the "winning" spouse can reasonably assume that he or she has been designated a better parent
than the supposed loser, the choice in reality constitutes a selection between two parents who are more than likely both imperfect in different and usually incomparable ways. The custodial
order cannot be called a special endorsement of parenting ability, but that is its effect within the divorced family.
Many negotiated settlements under current law have similar
effects on parents. As they discuss the custody question, parents
and their attorneys are continually reminded of a court's probable response to the facts known to the attorneys. The resulting
agreement is a distortion of what the parties would have negotiated for themselves if no court hovered near to enforce the exclusive custody rule.
The present divorce process conceals the parents' status as the
most knowledgeable people available to determine the best interests of their own children. 4 If any subjective judgment is ap92. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 53, at 4-10. The authors assert that the goal of
any negotiation should be a wise, efficient, and fair agreement which supports the ongoing relationships of the parties. Id. at 4.
93. Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J.
FAM. L. 21, 29-37 (1965). Professor Lon Fuller has asserted that polycentric problems,
such as the postdivorce parent-child relationship, contain multiple interacting points of
influence and choice and as such are unsuited to resolution by adjudication. Fuller,
supra note 19, at 353, 404.
94. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 957-58.
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plied, it should be the reasoned judgment of the parents. The
court process is not structured to support or encourage the development of reasoned parental agreement. General evidentiary
and procedural limitations, relative inflexibility in the remedies
that can be provided, and a lack of daily contact with the family
and the child9 5 hurt the court's ability to render wise judgment.
Under this Article's proposal, some divorced parents might establish a family environment less than ideal for their children,
but such lack of perfection is not significantly different from either the childrearing experiences among parents in ongoing marriages or the present judicial decisionmaking record. A judge or
jury's decision is not guaranteed to be better than that of the
parents, and given the institutional obstacles, it may not on average be as good. Moreover, forcing divorcing parents to shoulder ultimate responsibility for negotiating their child's rearing
environment should increase parental cooperation in the future.
Third, this Article's proposal would eliminate the psychological and emotional stress that imposition of the exclusivity rule
causes. Both custodial and noncustodial parents suffer psychologically under the present system.96 The custodial parent staggers under the burden of full responsibility for the children's activities, and the noncustodian chafes under the stigma of having
been stripped of basic parental rights and duties. Under the proposed reform, the parent in possession of the children at any one
time would be able to share psychological responsibility for the
children, and the parent not in possession at that moment would
continue to feel included in the parental relationship. The details of the allocation of these duties between the parents would
depend on the personalities, attitudes, and activities of the parents and their children, a not unreasonable result given their
original choice to marry and have children. Improved fatherchild bonds should decrease the persistent and harmful practice
of reducing or eliminating agreed upon child support payments,
may increase the frequency and dependability of father-child
visitation, and may discourage parental kidnapping.
95. Trader v. Dear, 565 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1978). Judge Pope wrote:
Many students of the parent-child relations make valid arguments that such
matters as access, the details of visitation, and child rearing are often better
resolved by responsible parents than by courts. . . . The endless number of details incident to child rearing, the court's lack of time and its crowded docket,
the court's lack of supervisory personnel, the inability to predict the future, and
the advantages of resolving matters without the expense of court hearings, justify responsible parental arrangements ....
Id. at 236 (citation omitted); see also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 956-58.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 42-52.
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Fourth, the proposal would emphasize the personal and private nature of family decisionmaking. These factors have been
recognized as essential to healthy family relationships within the
ongoing marriage. It is difficult to see the logic in a legal structure that promotes these values as a major strength of the family, but only if the parents remain married. The divorced family's continued depersonalization will create increasingly divisive
and unsettling effects as the percentage of such families within
society grows. Educational and psychological support, individual
attention and nurturing, and a sense of self-worth are all benefits of the intensely personal nature of family life. A principle of
continuing joint parental responsibility will increase the chances
that those benefits will survive a family's divorce.
Fifth, eliminating the legal custody determination should decrease substantially the bitter parental confrontation that the
existing legal structure encourages, and remove altogether the
emotional and psychological damage that frequently accompanies bitter custody trials. Divorcing parents would focus on the
two remaining issues: the level of each parent's financial contribution to the child's welfare, and the timing of the child's physical presence with each parent. Both issues allow for an almost
unlimited variation in solutions, while legal custody is a winnertake-all proposition. Greater choice brings with it greater likelihood that a win-win solution can be identified and accepted.
Sixth, this Article's proposal would greatly increase equal access to the legal system for parents who want to retain some of
their parental rights and obligations. A custody contest's financial, emotional, and relationship costs are so high that many parents negotiate away their rights because they are either unable
or unwilling to incur so large an expense.9 The proposal protects legal relationships between both divorced parents and their
children to the same extent as they would have been if the family were still intact. Although one advantage of divorce may be
to eliminate the need for negotiating a direct relationship between the two spouses, the same rationale is inapplicable to parental relationships. The children were jointly conceived and
raised to the point of divorce; the biological and emotional ties
continue unchanged after divorce except for the physical and
psychological separation of the parents. Society should expect
parents, as parents, to continue to interact in the best interests
of the children, regardless of marital status. Many divorced parents live up to this expectation now. Once society acknowledges
97.

See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 958.
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this expectation through its legal system, even more parents
should provide it.
Under the proposed reform, only gross parental misbehavior
would serve as a legal excuse for suspending parental obligations, and that legal impact would occur in the same way
whether the parent is married, widowed, divorced, or single. All
parents would have as much access in divorce to a healthy parent-child relationship as they did in marriage, because the
health and vitality of that relationship continues to depend on
the initial conditions: the personalities, attitudes, values, and activities of the members.
Finally, the legal system would support the growing members
of divorced families in the same way as it does the members of
ongoing marriages. The system currently presumes that divorced
parents are less capable of governing their own parent-child relationships. Soon one of every three or four parents will be divorced. 8 Such a large segment of our population will no longer
tolerate separate and distinctly discriminatory treatment.
B.

Potential Problems

Eliminating court responsibility and supervision from parentchild issues in the divorce process and afterwards could create
serious problems.
Major conflict- Divorced parents will continue to disagree,
sometimes violently and with permanently damaging results.
Courts appear to play an important role as final arbiter when
frustration and anger build within divorced families. If courts
are not open to hear these postdivorce disputes, many innocent
parents and children could be hurt. Without the court's intervention, how would we handle parental kidnapping or the cases
of bitter spouses who move to new states or use psychological
warfare with the children to attack and hurt former partners?
This Article's proposal addresses the problems of such major
conflict in several ways. First, criminal laws would continue to
apply to any parental kidnapping that defeated the physical residence schedule worked out during the divorce process. Moreover, courts would be open to divorced parents for situations involving acts of violence, child abuse, or other gross parental
unfitness, just as they are currently available to parents within
ongoing marriages. Barring evidence of criminal behavior, vio98.

See Sacks Testimony, supra note 32, at 78-79.
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lence, or unfitness, the best policy is to rely upon the consensual
processes of negotiation and mediation, or a mandatory arbitration procedure that is more flexible, efficient, accessible, and responsive than the courts. Although few public institutions exist
today that provide fact-finding, negotiation, and mediation support for families, whether divorced or not, neighborhood mediation centers are becoming much more numerous throughout the
country. 9 With adequate support services in place, most of the
troubled divorced families should be able to accept and share
their childrearing responsibilities without serious violence or
enmity.
The demand for court intervention assumes that if a final arbiter were readily available, the problems of major conflict
would be resolved. However, substantial problems still exist even
though courts are currently intervening in divorced family
squabbles. Furthermore, in ongoing marriages there are major
conflicts between parents over childrearing decisions, but our
system recognizes that, absent criminal, abusive, or violent conduct, substituting a court order for parental control is not an
improvement even if dissension, confusion, or indecision exist.
Forcing divorced parents to accept full responsibility for the future of their sons and daughters could reduce substantially the
number of instances of impasse, violent or otherwise. Under this
Article's proposal, negotiated and mediated agreements would
remain enforceable in court as they are today, and as a last resort divorced parents could seek an arbitration decision which,
once made, would also be judicially enforceable.
Difficulties with visitation times and support paymentsImplementation of the proposal would not eliminate the demand
for modification or enforcement of visitation times and child
support payments. Neither of these issues seems to generate as
much emotional and psychological heat at the initial divorce
level as legal custody, but they do form the bulk of current
postdivorce controversies. Although this Article suggests that
these issues be resolved through negotiation, mediation and, if
necessary, mandatory arbitration, the proposal will not avoid
court intervention for enforcement of visitation times and support amounts already determined. It may even increase the
number of these complaints made to courts as beleaguered parents use this route to vent their frustration over problems in negotiating other responsibility issues.
99. See Murray, Guideposts for an InstitutionalFramework of Consensual Dispute
Processing, 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45, 50-66.
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Lack of statistics showing what would happen if divorced parents shared responsibility for their children without threat of
court intervention represents a major difficulty in evaluating this
argument. No American jurisdiction has such a structure for
handling visitation and child support. Until it is tried, predictions are speculative. The proposal shifts the forum for determining schedules and allocations from the courts to mediation
and arbitration, which are less formal and adversarial, and more
efficient, participatory, and accessible for the parties. Experience
from other areas suggests that divorced parents should react
positively to this environment.10 0
Confusion in decisionmaking channels- The proposal's
adoption might generate instability and confusion in the decisionmaking channels in divorced families, creating a poor environment within which to raise children. 10 ' The only way to assure reasonable order for decisions within a separated family
unit under the proposal would be to limit its availability to those
parents who are able to work well together. Parents within this
narrow group already have the option in most states to develop
mutually agreeable joint custody arrangements.1 0 2 Why expand
the class of divorced parents eligible for joint parental responsibility if it will only promote unstable patterns of authority for
children?
Courts and commentators often point to the probability of
conflict and instability as a primary reason for denying joint custody in cases in which the parents cannot agree to cooperate.' 03
Nevertheless, the current legal structure provides no encouragement to divorced parents toward voluntary resolution of disagreements that arise. If anything, it encourages adversarial and
stubborn attitudes on the part of the parent who has the most
clearly defined legal rights under the circumstances. Consensual
methods of dispute resolution within the divorce setting are
given few opportunities to produce a stable balance between
100. See McEwan & Maiman, supra note 54, at 47 (small claims court and
mediation).
101. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 13-14. The authors' psychological parent theory places prime importance on the stability of the child's environment.
Id. at 17-20, 37-39. For a critical examination of the stability factor, see Cole, supra note
12.
102. Even in states that do not recognize joint custody, divorced parents who work
well together can establish their own decisionmaking structure, regardless of provisions
to the contrary in settlement agreements or court decrees.
103. See, e.g., Bliss ex rel. Ach v. Ach, 56 N.Y.2d 995, 998, 439 N.E.2d 349, 350, 453
N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (1982); Foster & Freed, supra note 27, at 145; Kapner, supra note 57,
at 686-87.
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harmony and conflict, except as individual lawyers might help
their clients in this direction. If divorced parents realized that
they must cooperate in making decisions for their children, that
neither parent could use court intervention as a threat or a tool
to control the other, most parents would discover ways to work
out their disagreements within the family setting.
Moreover, decisionmaking channels among many parents
within ongoing marriages are probably less ordered and more
unstable than judges and commentators assume. If we allow intact families to retain their privacy and authority despite unstable communication patterns, divorced families would appear to
be no less deserving.
Additionally, a natural communication system develops between parents, whether married or divorced, which is defined by
the personalities, attitudes, values, and general activities of the
family members. Children within a family adjust to and use that
system. 104 Parents rather than judges and juries are in a far better position to establish that system and evaluate how their children are doing within it.' A certain stability in parent-child interactions will persist through the marriage and into the divorce.
It may be important for children to continue within that pattern, regardless of how many faults and confusions the experts
and judges might recognize.
Finally, if an unacceptably high conflict level exists and persists within a divorced family, a parent could receive court intervention based upon alleged intentional abuse or neglect of the
children or possible criminal conduct.
The problems of serial possession- When a parent does not
have possession of a child, he or she is at a disadvantage in participating in decisions affecting the child. To recognize equal or
shared responsibility would not accord with the reality of serial
rather than concurrent possession existing within the postdivorce family.
Yet parents in an intact family often face similar possession
variances. Many parents travel extensively in their work, and
some work evening shifts and weekends. A stable divorced fam104. In a real sense the psychological bonding of parent and child is based on this
attachment to a familial system of communication and activity. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 17-20. Criticism of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach has
focused primarily on those authors' insistence that the family system will not be helpful
to the child unless it is based upon regular, day-to-day personal interaction. Davis, supra
note 20, at 567-69 (pointing to the growing evidence that the child needs an "emotional
universe" which includes mother, father, grandparents, and others).
105. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 49-52.
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ily could even be less separated physically or psychologically
than its intact counterpart. Family decision patterns adjust to
parental schedules regardless of physical location. If confusing
schedules within intact families do not raise questions of intervention, why should similar situations within divorced families,
assuming the absence of abuse or neglect?
No matter what the degree of separation, decisionmaking authority within a family falls into three categories: those
childrearing decisions that necessarily must be made by the parent in possession; those decisions that need consultation but in
the end will be controlled by the parent in possession; and those
decisions that require both consultation and mutual agreement
before they can be made. For each divorced family, as with its
intact counterpart, the types of decisions falling into each of
these three categories may differ greatly. And they should do so,
if there is any truth to the theory that the resulting balance of
harmony and conflict is sensitive to individual personalities, attitudes, values, and activities.1 0 The state should allow divorced
families to establish their decisionmaking patterns in ways that
meet their own needs, not the needs of certain experts, legisla07
tors, judges, or jurors.'
The appeal of an exclusive authority- It is difficult to suppress a natural desire for the simplicity of having an exclusive
authority, the custodial parent backed by the court, for all
postdivorce decisions.1 0 8 Negotiations among equals can be timeconsuming, frustrating, and messy, especially if the negotiators
have shown an inability to develop a good working relationship.10 9 Moreover, the state appears to be intervening more in
intact families to protect the best interests of children from
overreaching and abusive parents.1 10 Parental autonomy may be
less of a standard today than it once was.
106. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
107. See Davis, supra note 20, at 571-72; Guggenheim, supra note 26, at 553-54.
108. See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 886-93. For an interesting discussion of our "collective American faith" in formal procedure, see Bezanson, The Myths of Formalism:An
Essay on Our Faith That Formalism Yields Fairness and Effectiveness in Public Administration, 69 IowA L. REV. 957, 973 (1984).
109. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 53, at 19-22.
110. While the law generally assumes that a parent is acting in the best interests of
his or her child, the state has expanded its supervision of parental activities during the
past two decades in response to increasing evidence of abuse and a new sensitivity to
children's rights. Recent statutes relating to parental neglect and abuse and court opinions supporting decisions by minors in the face of parental disapproval, see, e.g., Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), are indications of this trend. The fact of closer state review
of parental action, by itself, is an erosion of the pre-1960 level of parental autonomy. In
addition, common law doctrines of parental and interspousal immunity have been over-
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This desire for a mandatory arbiter in the postdivorce setting
at least partly results from the long legal tradition of exclusive
custody. Intervention is not even suggested for most intact families that suffer from poor negotiating or communicating practices. Where autonomy is the tradition, we accept the inefficiency and complexity of the negotiation process. Centuries of
state domination of divorced families may have distorted our
perspective. Adoption of this Article's proposal would help develop a consistent approach to family interaction, regardless of
marital status, and therefore coordinate popular expectations
with the newly perceived needs of children in divorce.
In recent decades legislatures and courts have established
more limits to parental autonomy than existed before. These
limits include the abuse, neglect, and unfitness standards. The
existence of these express limits at least serves as an important
protection for children in divorced as well as intact families, and
should be relied upon without regard to marital status. Subject
to these increased limits to parental discretion, the parental autonomy and family privacy concepts for the intact family appear
to be uniformly well accepted today.
Moreover, it seems contradictory for Americans to endorse so
strongly an open negotiation system for intact families regardless of the level of parental conflict, while promoting a strict authoritarian structure for families in divorce. Two or more people
negotiating, like a democracy, is always more inefficient and
messy than one person with the authority to make all the decisions. Negotiation may perhaps be the worst method for family
decisionmaking except for all the other methods that have been
111
tried from time to time.
turned in a majority of states during the past decade. See, e.g., Shearer v. Shearer, 18
Ohio St. 3d 94, 98-99, 480 N.E.2d 388, 390-94 (1985) (confirming the overturning of parental immunity done seven months before and overruling the interspousal immunity
rule).
It is arguable that this erosion has occurred because the legal concept of parenft~l autonomy had developed an unacceptable indifference to the health, safety, and individuality of family members. Autonomy meant immunity under traditional societal staadards,
and the effect of this immunity was harmfully distorting the relationships within the
family and between the family and society. Recently imposed limits on parental autonomy appear to fall into one of three separate areas: protection of a child's health or
safety, protection of a child's fundamental, constitutionally protected interests, and protection of a legitimate governmental interest that has an incidental effect on parent-child
relationships. Such limited constraints are supported by the natural concern of government in the healthy interaction of all its citizens, regardless of marital situation.
111. My apologies to Sir Winston Churchill, who stated: "[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time." Sir Winston Churchill, House of Commons Speech, Nov. 11,
1947, reprinted in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, His COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7566
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CONCLUSION

Family integrity and parental autonomy are recognized as fundamental to the health and growth of intact families. When families enter the divorce setting, however, these principles are exchanged for their opposites: state intervention and exclusive
control. Many existing problems plaguing postdivorce families
might be resolved by divorce law changes recognizing the continued importance of parental responsibility and autonomy.
I have proposed a legal reform that would establish consistency within families, regardless of marital status. Under this
proposal, a state would continue to recognize parental obligations and autonomy throughout the divorce process. Legal custody, whether sole or joint, would not be an issue for a court,
because both parents would remain obligated on an equal basis
to "nurture, support, educate and protect" their children.1 12 The
primary parent-child issues would be the timing of child residence with each parent and the amount and allocation of child
support. These two issues are more amenable than legal custody
to resolution by negotiation or mediation. Therefore, I have included in the proposal the requirement that state-coordinated
mediation and, if necessary, mandatory arbitration be available
to handle the child residence and support issues. Mediation and
arbitration are generally more informal, flexible, efficient, and
accessible than the courts. Courts would no longer be involved
11 3
directly in parent-child relationship issues upon divorce.
The behavioral pattern that this Article's proposal supports
may be little different from what actually happens today for
some families that never participate in a contested hearing, either during the divorce or thereafter. " 4 Such divorced families
establish their own patterns, with some former spouses sharing
the parental load more equally than others. For these divorced
families, the decisionmaking process remains joint, voluntary,
and participatory. These families create their own stable, supportive patterns for mutual childrearing in spite of the obstacles
(R. James ed. 1974).
112. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975).
113. Except, of course, if there were questions of abuse, neglect, or other gross failure

of parental care. See

BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 2, at 59-109.

114. Although more behavioral research needs to be done on families in divorce, my
personal experience, both as a lawyer with ten years of general practice and as a noncustodial divorced parent, suggests that a substantial number of divorced parents do share
responsibility for their children despite the requirements for exclusivity demanded by
the divorce decree.

SPRING 1986]
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the law has built against such patterns. The legal system should
support these families by devising legal concepts that encourage
divorced family members to work together. The proposal accomplishes this goal.
If this Article's proposal is adopted, divorced families that are
now unable to establish a shared relationship would be forced to
accept personal responsibility for their children's environment
and future. Courts would no longer be available to enforce one
parent's decision over the other's, except as one might overstep
the bounds of acceptable behavior in provoking or permitting
harm to the children or to society.
By removing the threat, and often the reality, of a state-mandated structure for parent-child relationships within the divorced family, this proposal would promote a more natural environment for an increasing number of American families. Over
time, a family develops its own patterns of interaction in response to the personalities, attitudes, values, and activities of its
members. Imposing a set structure on the family, whether sole
or joint custody, distorts these unique family traits and produces
an unnatural environment for its members. Parent-child relationships should be allowed to evolve naturally, regardless of the
marital status of the parents. The benefits of privacy, autonomy,
and family integrity should be accorded to divorced family
members as well as to members of intact families.
Conflict may occur within the new divorced family system this
Article proposes, but conflict remains a part of human experience. Children must learn how to deal with conflict in a way consistent with their personalities and family backgrounds. Its existence within the divorced family setting may be as much a sign
of continued love for and interest in the children as an indication of parental bitterness and distrust. Moreover, lessons for
children might be more instructive within a free-flowing family
system encouraged by this proposal than within a system held
together by state intervention, court orders, and jail terms. Finally, once divorced parents realize that they alone are responsible for their children's future, that they must continue to share
parental responsibilities, and that the court cannot be used as a
battleground for a parental war, they will probably reduce the
incidence and intensity of the conflict that has a negative impact
on the family unit.
The most important elements of a healthy family environment
may be the intangible emotional and psychological bonding
among all the members. By allowing the divorced family to develop its own relationships in congruence with its individual per-
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sonalities, values, attitudes, and activities, the legal structure
would be supporting a natural pattern for all family life.

